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 Refl ection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion 
that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a 
human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts with-
out being able to state or comprehend them.   (Nagel 1974) 
10
 INTRODUCTION 
 Evolutionary epistemology is an inter- and transdisciplinary research area that associ-
ates both with philosophy of biology and with the evolutionary sciences. It understands 
knowledge as an evolved phenomenon displayed by  all biological species (Campbell 
1974; Wuketits 1989; Bradie 1986; Gontier 2006a). Evolutionary epistemologists inves-
tigate how species acquire and transmit information and knowledge about the world, 
how and to what extent the evolved systems of knowledge of biological species in turn 
inform us of the ontological state of the universe, and how knowledge itself evolves over 
the course of evolutionary time. 
 In this chapter, we outline how, by making use of the evolutionary sciences, evolu-
tionary epistemology diff ers from traditional epistemological fi elds, and we demon-
strate how evolutionary epistemology fi ts into the broader fi eld of philosophy of biology. 
Besides by means of natural selection, evolution can occur by a myriad of evolutionary 
mechanisms and we briefl y outline how this plurality results in various evolutionary 
epistemologies. While early evolutionary epistemologists favored a hypothetical realist 
position, today scholars favor constructivist approaches to knowledge. Th is means that 
scholars no longer adhere to the view that organisms re-present an outer world through 
the process of adaptation, but that organisms actively participate in constructing the 
world, by building species-specifi c biorealities. Rather than present an encompassing 
evolutionary epistemology, in this chapter we provide a research program on how to 
study these biorealities. 
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 KNOWLEDGE IS AN EVOLVED PHENOMENON DISPLAYED 
BY ALL BIOLOGICAL ORGANISMS 
 From the ancient Greeks onwards, philosophers have assumed that only humans can 
obtain true knowledge (“ episteme ”) of the world as it is in itself. True knowledge was 
understood to involve a relation between an individual human knower and the outer 
world (Pinxten 1997), a relation that was thought to be expressed exclusively in linguistic 
propositions (Figure 10.1). 
 At the dawn of the 20th century, however, the early Wittgenstein (1922) demonstrated 
that we cannot prove by making use of logic that our linguistic propositions relate to the 
world. Th e later Wittgenstein (1953) understood language not as an epistemic tool whereby 
we represent the world, but as a system that results from sociocultural interactions. 
 Subsequently, two new schools developed concerning how we are to understand 
knowledge, one proclaiming that knowledge is a sociological phenomenon, the other that 
it is an evolved phenomenon. Following Wittgenstein, scholars understood “paradigms” 
(Kuhn 1962) and “epistemic fi elds” (Foucault 1969) as “regimes of truth” (Foucault 1971) 
or “scientifi c research programs” (Lakatos 1978) that are defi ned by human actors who 
are part of sociocultural and political communities (Figure 10.2). From within such a 
Sociology of Knowledge, knowledge becomes redefi ned as a relation between diff erent 
knowers (Munz 1993). 
 Figure 10.1  Classic view of knowledge 
 For classic philosophers, epistemology goes hand in hand with solving the reference problem, that is, the problem of 
how our language, that is considered an expression of our thoughts and empirical observations, corresponds to the 
matters of fact of the outer world. For empiricists, the world gives us impressions that we transform into language 
that we use to speak about the world. For rationalists, our mind possesses the right mental, linguistic categories to 
understand our senses and the objects they perceive in the world. Knowledge is therefore defi ned as a somewhat 
direct relation between humans and the world that becomes expressed in language. 
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 By adopting an evolutionary stance, evolutionary epistemologists reject the idea 
that knowledge is  solely the product of sociocultural traditions where humans develop 
consensus-views on what is true or false; and they reject the idea that knowledge is exclu-
sively located in the human mind or the consequence of empirical observation. Instead, 
all organisms are recognized to have knowledge and knowledge is redefi ned as a rela-
tion between the evolved organism and the outer world (Wuketits 2006). Th e mind, our 
senses, language, culture, and society are recognized as evolved phenomena (Campbell 
1959), and evolutionary epistemology therefore tries to provide an evolutionary foun-
dation for the sociological and cultural phenomena that are associated with knowledge 
formation. Th e cognitive capacity to learn (Piaget 1971) and the sociocultural capacity 
to transmit learned knowledge across generations (Skinner 1986) are recognized as out-
comes of evolutionary processes. Because knowledge is defi ned as a relation between 
all organisms and the world, for evolutionary epistemologists the question of how our 
evolved knowledge relates to the outer, physical world remains a valid research question 
(Figure 10.3). 
 Organisms have evolved anatomical adaptations to their environments, as well as 
cognitive schemes of reaction and behavioral patterns that allow them to survive and 
reproduce in the world. Evolutionary epistemologists (Lorenz 1941; Campbell 1959) 
understand the evolved anatomy, cognition, and behavior of organisms as systems of 
information that embody knowledge about the world. It is embodied because it neither 
comes in the form of language, nor do species need to be conscious about the knowledge 
they have—their bodies literally embody knowledge. 
 Many biological individuals also demonstrate knowledge that surpasses their individ-
ual anatomy, cognition, and behavior. Either the knowledge is somehow “carried” by the 
group instead of by each organism individually (which is something that happens espe-
cially in sociocultural systems), or the group-knowledge externalizes and oft en material-
izes (in termite mounds, for example, or colonies, or shared technological tool complexes 
that become part of the species’ environment). Several primates and most hominids, for 
 Figure 10.2  Sociology of Knowledge 
 Knowledge is understood as a consensus-based relation entertained between diff erent humans. How our knowledge 
relates to the physical environment is secondary to understanding how power, hegemony, and sociocultural tradi-
tions are established and how they found worldviews. 
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 Figure 10.3 Evolutionary epistemology 
 Knowledge is understood as an evolved relation between the entire organism and its environment. Organisms have 
evolved anatomical features, cognitive capacities, and behavioral patterns that provide them with means to respond 
to and anticipate their biotic and abiotic environment, enabling them to survive and reproduce. Th ese features are 
understood as informational systems that enable the acquisition of knowledge about the environment. 
example, accumulate information on how to use and manufacture tools, knowledge that 
is culturally transmitted over generations through time. And humans have a biologically 
evolved capacity to learn language, but they learn the specifi c language they speak from 
their caregivers. Societies, cultures, or languages function as “extended minds” (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998; Clark 1999) that are studied from within a general evolutionary frame-
work, as evolved traits. 
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 DIFFERENT EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES RESULT IN DIFFERENT 
EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGIES 
 It is a fascinating fact that the various life forms that exist today have evolved diff erent 
means to survive and reproduce in this world. Th ese diff erent means represent evolved 
information, but the question remains if, how, and to what extent this information ref-
erences the outer world. Bats and dolphins, for example, have evolved particular ana-
tomical, cognitive, and behavioral traits that enable them to navigate in their specifi c 
environment. Bats are well suited to survive and reproduce in a terrestrial or aerial envi-
ronment, but, unlike dolphins, they do not possess knowledge on how to survive within 
a marine environment. Each organism connects with certain but not other aspects of the 
living and non-living world, up to the point that one can argue that organisms live in 
species-specifi c biologically informed realities or “ biorealities .” We return to this concept 
later in the chapter. Here, we focus on how evolutionary epistemology tries to answer the 
questions of how organismal knowledge evolved, and how it lends insight into the outer 
world. Th e answer given is variable and dependent upon the evolutionary framework 
one adheres to. 
 Following Darwin, the founders of the fi eld of evolutionary epistemology (Lorenz 
1941; Campbell 1959, 1974; Piaget 1971; Skinner 1986) understood the evolved anatom-
ical features, cognitive capacities, and behavioral patterns from within an adaptationist 
(Lamarck 1809) and selectionist (Darwin 1859) framework. Organisms are understood 
to adapt to the outer environment, which results in species-specifi c ways of surviving 
and reproducing; and natural and sexual selection occurs at the interface between an 
organism and its environment (which contains both biotic and abiotic components). If 
organisms display anatomical features, cognitive capacities, and behavioral patterns that 
enable them to survive long enough to reproduce, then in accordance with natural selec-
tion theory, it may be assumed that these traits are adapted to the outer world. If organ-
isms and the various traits they display are not adaptive, then organisms are naturally 
weeded out. 
 Such an adaptationist and selectionist view enabled the early evolutionary episte-
mologists to maintain a hypothetical realist view (Campbell 1960). Organisms are 
considered to “fi t” to the world when they are able to survive and reproduce, and adap-
tations are understood as evolved re-presentations of the outer world. Konrad Lorenz 
(1941), for example, famously wrote that “the hoof of the horse is already adapted to the 
ground of the steppe before the horse is born.” Karl Popper (1963, 1972) saw a direct 
analogy with natural selection theory when he assumed organisms to be like evolved 
conjectures about the world that somewhat approximate reality or are “corroborated” 
by reality when they are adapted, and that are “refuted” or “falsifi ed” by the external 
environment when they are maladaptive. Donald Campbell (1974) drew strong parallels 
between natural selection theory and Popper’s theory of conjectures and refutations, 
as well as B. F. Skinner’s (1986) theory of trial and error learning, and suggested that 
our bodies constantly test our hypothetical ideas about the outer world. And follow-
ing Popper (1972: 145; 1984: 19–31) who defi ned “organs” as embodied “theories” and 
theories are exosomatic organs, Peter Munz (1993) called organisms “embodied theo-
ries” and theories (understood as both scientifi c thoughts and sociocultural ideas) were 
dubbed “disembodied organisms.” One can, for example, state that a fi sh provides an as 
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yet unfalsifi ed theory of the water, and by studying the anatomy and behavior of a fi sh, 
one can acquire knowledge of the water. A scientifi c theory is a disembodied organism 
because it evolves through time, it develops new features, and unfi t ideas are eliminated 
by the environment. 
 From the viewpoint of hypothetical realism, natural selection becomes nature’s way 
to conjecture, test, falsify, or confi rm evolved hypotheses or theories about the world, 
hypotheses that are embodied in the form of evolved organisms. Knowledge accumu-
lates or grows over evolutionary time, and biological species can even be understood 
as instruments to acquire knowledge of the outer world (Munz 1993). We humans, for 
example, cannot see ultraviolet light, but we can point toward scorpions and butterfl ies 
that can. Besides the technical instruments that humans have developed over the course 
of history, life’s biodiversity provides a further means to uncover the various layers of 
reality. 
 Th e hypothetical realism adhered to by these scholars (Campbell 1960; Hooker 
1989) is nonetheless already tempered through the acknowledgment that there remains 
a discrepancy between the biological and the purely physical world. Organisms are not 
literal re-presentations of the outer world because (1) living organisms simply diff er 
from the abiotic world even though they are made up of inorganic matter; (2) adap-
tive organisms diff er from one another; and (3) successful survival and reproduction 
does not necessarily imply that organisms are adaptive, it merely means that they are 
not maladaptive. Th e fact that some organisms survive and reproduce might be due to 
an abundance of resources, and if a scarcity would arise, competing or predator spe-
cies might cause the former to go extinct. Non-falsifi ed organisms or theories are not 
immediately representative of the outer world, they might simply not have been put to 
the test yet. 
 Today, the early hypothetical realist views are treated more cautiously. Since the 
foundation of the Modern Synthesis, numerous fi elds have questioned several tenets of 
the core neo-Darwinian framework. New research avenues have opened up including, 
amongst others: 
 1.  Evo-devo: a fi eld that studies niche construction (Lewontin 1982, 2000; Odling-
Smee 1988), phenotypic plasticity (West-Eberhard 2003), developmental systems 
(Griffi  ths & Grey 1994; Oyama 2000), and epigenetic mechanisms (Jablonka & 
Lamb 1989, 2006). 
 2.  Ecology (Van Valen 1973; Odum 1994; Lewontin 2000): a fi eld that divides “the envi-
ronment” into a biotic and abiotic component and investigates the various interac-
tions amongst them. 
 3.  Macroevolution (Serrelli & Gontier 2015): a research endeavor that studies evolution 
at the grand scale, beyond populations. 
 4.  Reticulate evolution (Gontier 2015): a vernacular term for evolution as it occurs 
through hybridization (Arnold 1997), horizontal gene transfer, infectious hered-
ity, symbiosis, and symbiogenesis (Margulis & Sagan 2000; Rosenberg et al. 2007; 
Gilbert et al. 2012). 
 Th ese various schools have further specifi ed the exact nature of the organism, the envi-
ronment, and the relation that exists between these entities. Th e founders of the Modern 
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Synthesis treated the organism and the environment as somewhat homogenous entities, 
and the relation between them was considered unidirectional from the environment to 
the organism. An organism was either adapted to its external environment or it was not, 
and it was the environment that, through selection, molded which organisms survived 
and reproduced. 
 Today, we recognize that organisms are heterogeneous entities that besides displaying 
adaptive traits, oft en simultaneously display maladaptive traits, or neutral traits (Kimura 
1968), and existing traits can become exapted for other functions (Gould & Lewontin 
1979). Our laryngeal tract, for example, enables a rich vocal palate that allows for diff er-
entiated speech, but it also facilitates choking. 
 Ecological and macroevolutionary perspectives have further diversifi ed “the environ-
ment.” For one, the environment where the hypothesized struggle for existence occurs 
is by and large made up of other organisms (Van Valen 1973). Second, these diff erent 
organisms group together into complexes that form populations, communities, ecosys-
tems, and ultimately the biosphere (see Figure 10.4). And third, the abiotic environment 
also consists of a multilayered nested hierarchy, where abiotic processes can infl uence the 
further course of evolution (Salthe 1985; Tëmkin & Eldredge 2015). 
 Constructivist approaches necessitate rethinking the classic relation between organ-
isms and the environment and provide more reciprocal and dynamic views. Th ere does 
not merely exist a struggle for existence over scare resources, and organisms are not 
merely passive vehicles that adapt to their environment due to outer selection processes. 
Th ey actively construct their environment (Gould & Lewontin 1979; Lewontin 1982) in 
such a way that even inhospitable environments become inhabitable. Numerous organ-
isms anticipate winter and store food. On an ecological level, many species not merely 
compete, but also interact in such a way that new metabolic cycles, tissues, or biologi-
cal individuals are formed (Margulis & Sagan 2000). Anaerobic bacteria, for example, 
that get poisoned by oxygen, symbiotically populate the oxygen-low gut environment of 
many mammals where they contribute to the good digestion of their host; and lichens 
are symbiotic organisms made up of distinct species—algae that partner up with cyano-
bacteria and/or fungi. 
 Rather than demonstrate adaptation toward an external environment, niche con-
struction and symbiosis demonstrate adaptability (Warburton 1956), or an organism’s 
ability to actively modify and build the environment in such a way that it becomes 
adapted to it. Such traits do not necessarily result in a one-to-one correspondence with 
the physical world that exists outside the organism; rather, organisms are less repre-
sentative or referential of an “independent outer world.” Species form an active part in 
building the biosphere, an infl uence that extends well into the abiotic world. Th e earth’s 
atmosphere, for example, is oxygen-rich, and 90 percent of that oxygen was created as a 
waste-product by early cyanobacteria (Margulis & Sagan 2002). 
 Constructivist approaches (Vollmer 1984; Riedl 1987; Hooker 1989), and even non-
adaptationist views (Wuketits 2006) have been put forward to explain how organisms 
and the species they group into embody knowledge, not merely by “re-presenting” the 
“outer” world, but by actively constructing it. While hypothetical realism assumes a fi t 
between the organism and the environment, within constructivist views it is recognized 
that over evolutionary time distinct biorealities have emerged. As such, there is no con-
stant “outer world,” but an ever-changing sequential series of emerging biorealities. 
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 ORGANISMS CONSTRUCT SPECIES-SPECIFIC BIOREALITIES 
 Ancient philosophers investigated how human knowledge (epistemology) provides insight 
into the nature of the earth and the larger cosmos (ontology), but they thought the cosmos 
and its components were stable entities and any change that occurred was assumed to 
be repeated in a cycle of coming and becoming. Ancient philosophers therefore merely 
sought to fi nd the right order of the cosmic hierarchy, a hierarchy and order they assumed 
to be eternal. Today, we know that the universe originated approximately 13.7 billion years 
ago, and life originated on earth somewhat 4 billion years ago. Every abiotic and biotic 
entity must therefore have come into being, and what exists as “real” is variable over time. 
With the origin of the universe, various types of matter and energy originated, and with 
the origin of living beings, various forms of knowledge evolved. Th e knowledge that spe-
cies embody and materialize is diverse, and results from organism-environmental inter-
actions. Th e relation between the biotic and abiotic world is dynamic in kind, and the 
knowledge that accumulates from this interaction is variable in time and space. Conse-
quently, there is no essential and given knowledge system, nor does there exist a fi xed or 
invariant truth that is waiting to be discovered by these various knowledge systems. 
 Whether and how the various knowledges that the living world acquired are in one-
to-one correspondence with an “outer world,” understood as a stable and purely physical 
world, are the wrong questions to ask. Rather, over time, multiple species-specifi c and 
species-bounded biological realities, or biorealities have evolved, realities that are also 
bounded by physical and chemical laws. What counts as “real” or “true” for one species 
might not count as “real” for another. We humans, for example, have especially adapted 
to a mesocosm (Vollmer 1984), a world of middle-sized objects. We cannot observe the 
bacteria that occupy our skin or gut, or the molecules that form a table, and we cannot 
observe the entire universe. Bacteria, on the other hand, even without possessing vision 
or brains, can easily overcome these biophysical boundaries and establish a biochemical 
communication with our skin, or penetrate deep inside table wood. 
 Because biological realities are species-specifi c and because species evolve, the vari-
ous biorealities that are formed over time are not stable. Th ere is not one homogenous 
outer world “out there.” Rather, over evolutionary time multiple and varying biorealities 
emerged. When species go extinct their specifi c bioreality oft en ceases to exist while new 
biorealities become constructed when new species evolve. Biorealities expand and con-
tract in time, in congruence with the species that build them, but boundaries are fuzzy. 
Th ough species-specifi c, diff erent biorealities oft en overlap, especially when diff erent spe-
cies occupy the same niche where they are dependent upon the same resources; or when 
species share common descent, and therefore share common traits that enable them to 
modify and construct their environment in similar ways. A purely solipsistic view, for 
example, extrapolated toward organisms or species, is impossible just because we can 
prove that at least all eukaryotic organisms are related to one another by common descent. 
 In sum, constructivist approaches necessitate a more dynamic and emergent view of 
the world. In so far as there existed an “outer world” before life originated, earth has sig-
nifi cantly altered in association and perhaps even in correspondence with the life forms 
that have evolved over time. Th ere does not exist an external relation between the organ-
ism and the world, the world has changed inside out, because of the organisms that have 
evolved, and therefore the world itself becomes an emerging and changing entity. A valid 
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question then becomes how these biorealities are ordered over time, that is, if and how 
these diff erent biorealities match together into a nested hierarchy (or multiple nested 
hierarchies), and how they together form a reality (or multiple realities). On a higher 
level, and to some extent, the various species-specifi c “biorealities” give prove of the exis-
tence of such larger hierarchically structured and nested entities. 
 APPLIED EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE WIDER 
FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 
 In this part we present a research program for how to study emerging biorealities. Applied 
evolutionary epistemology covers the following fi ve research areas: 
 1. What aspects or traits of biological individuals count as information or knowledge? 
 2.  How can evolutionary theories explain the origin and evolution of these information 
and knowledge systems? 
 3. Where do these knowledge systems evolve? 
 4.  How do the evolved knowledge systems underlie the construction of various bioreali-
ties and how can the latter in turn lend insight into the ontological layers of the world? 
 5.  Can evolutionary mechanisms themselves be regarded as knowledge-acquiring systems? 
 Th e fi rst research endeavor roughly coincides with research on the units of evolution 
(what evolves, Table 10.1), the second with research on the various evolutionary mech-
anisms that explain how these units evolve (Table 10.2); and the third coincides with 
research on the levels of evolution (where in “reality” or “the environment” these units 
evolve according to certain mechanisms, Figure 10. 4). Th ese three research endeavors 
are tightly related to one another, because identifying units of evolution always coincides 
with identifying the locus or level where this unit evolves as well as with the mechanism 
whereby the unit evolves at a certain level (Gontier 2010). 
 Darwin identifi ed the organism (what we today designate as the phenotype) as the unit of 
evolution, and he argued that the organism evolves at the level of the environment by means 
of natural selection. Following Darwin, philosophers (Brandon 1982) and evolutionary 
 Table 10.1 Examples of units of selection 
Unit Characterization
Replicator any entity able to “create copies of itself ” (Dawkins 1976: 15)
something that demonstrates “fecundity, longevity, and copying-fi delity” (Dawkins 1976: 18)
Meme “a unit of imitation” (Dawkins 1976: 192) 
“brain structures whose ‘phenotypic’ manifestation as behavior or artifact is the basis of their 
selection” (Dawkins 1982: 164)
Interactor “an entity that directly interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that 
replication is diff erential” (Hull 1980: 318)
Culturgene “that which generates culture” (Lumsden & Wilson 1981: 26)
“a relatively homogeneous set of artifacts, behaviors, or mentifacts (mental constructs having 
little or no direct correspondence with reality) that either share without exception one or more 
attribute states selected for their functional importance, or at least share a consistently recurrent 
range of such attribute states within a given polythetic set” (Lumsden & Wilson 1981: 27)
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biologists (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976, 1982; Lewontin 1970) originally focused exclu-
sively on identifying the units and levels of natural selection, by attempting to “universalize” 
the theory in approaches that became known as “universal Darwinism” (Dawkins 1982, 
1983) or “universal selectionism” (Cziko 1995). Besides anatomical, phenotypic form, these 
scholars also understand cognition or individual and even group behavior to be units that 
evolve by means of natural selection. And from within evolutionary epistemology, any and 
all biologically evolved traits can be understood as systems of information. 
 Universalization implies the following. When it is argued that science (Toulmin 1972; 
Hull 1988) or culture (Cavalli-Sforz & Feldman 1981; Lumsden & Wilson 1981; Boyd and 
Richerson 1985; Laland et al. 1995; Mesoudi 2015) evolve by means of natural selection, 
it needs to be demonstrated how Darwin’s theory of natural selection can be extrapolated 
toward sociocultural phenomena such as scientifi c or cultural knowledge, and also the 
units of sociocultural selection (e.g., ideas, rituals, or practices), as well as the levels where 
these entities evolve, need to be specifi ed. In this regard, Michael Bradie (1986) distin-
guished between the evolution of epistemological mechanisms (EEM) and the evolution-
ary epistemology of theories (EET) program: the former investigates the evolution of the 
biological organs and systems employed in the acquisition of knowledge, while the latter 
investigates the evolution of the knowledge corpuses that are constructed by knowers. 
 To explain how natural selection theory can be applied to the sociocultural domain, 
pioneering evolutionary epistemologists and evolutionary biologists (Table 10.2) have 
developed several “heuristics” (Campbell 1959, 1960), “Darwinian principles” (Lewontin 
1970), or “universal selection formulas” (Hull 1980; Plotkin 1994). 
 Th eorizing on the levels of selection (Figure 10.4) used to be associated with theoriz-
ing on how the “superorganic” (Hutton 1788; Spencer 1876; Sapir 1917) relates to the 
inorganic and organic layers of reality. Today, it is associated more with multilevel selec-
tion theory (Okasha 2005) as well as with ecologically and macroevolutionary-oriented 
fi elds where scholars actively build hierarchies of the biotic and abiotic world. We return 
to this when we discuss the fourth point. 
 First, it is important to emphasize that the classic units and levels of selection debate 
is currently more accurately defi ned as the units and levels of evolution debate (Gontier 
2010, 2012). Scholars nowadays recognize the existence of a myriad of units that evolve 
at various levels (Table 10.3), by a multitude of evolutionary mechanisms beyond natural 
 Table 10.2  Examples of universal selection formulas 
Blind variation and selective survival (Campbell 1959)
Blind variation and selective retention (Campbell 1960)
Phenotypic variation, diff erential fi tness (because of diff erent environments), and heritability of that fi tness 
(Lewontin 1970)
Conjectures and refutations (Popper 1963, 1972)
“A process in which the diff erential extinction and proliferation of interactors cause the diff erential 
perpetuation of the replicators that produced them” (Hull 1980: 381)
Replication, variation, and environmental interaction
(Replicator, interactor, lineage) (Hull 1980; Hull et al. 2001)
Blind trial and error learning (Skinner 1986)
Generate, test, regenerate schema (Plotkin 1994)
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 Figure 10.4  Examples of hierarchies of the biotic and abiotic world 
 From left  to right, Hutton’s geological and Spencer’ sociocultural distinction between the anorganic or non-living, 
organic or living and superorganic or sociocultural world; the biological hierarchy of what are considered real enti-
ties; the ecological hierarchy; and the theoretical genealogical hierarchy. 
 Table 10.3 Units of non-selectionist mechanisms 
Unit Characterization
Developmental systems theory
Reproducer “Th e pieces of development that are passed on in progeneration [that] confer the 
capacity to develop on the off spring” (Griesemer 2000: 361)
“Special or developmental progeneration is multiplication with material overlap of 
mechanisms conferring the capacity to develop. Development is acquisition of the 
capacity to reproduce. Reproduction, therefore, is progeneration of entities that 
develop.” (Griesemer 2000: 361)
Symbiosis and Symbiogenesis theory
Holobiont “Th e symbiotic complex” consisting of an individual biont and its (multiple) symbionts 
(Margulis 1991: 2–4)
Hologenome “Host genome + microbiome, including viriome” (Rosenberg & Zilber-Rosenberg 
2014: 111)
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selection. Evolution can be reticulate, or it can occur by means of genetic and ecological 
drift , niche construction, epigenetic mechanisms, and so on. 
 However, much work remains to be done in these new fi elds. Th e mechanisms that 
underlie reticulate evolution or the evolutionary emergence of (epigenetic) develop-
mental systems are still not fully understood, and scholars still need to “universalize” 
the units whereupon and the levels whereat such evolution occurs. Eco-evo-devo fi elds 
(Griffi  ths & Gray 1994; Hahlweg 1989; Jablonka & Lamb 1989, 2006; Oyama 2000) 
are currently investigating how organismal knowledge is oft en not reducible to genes. 
Internal structures such as bodily organs, hormonal and vascular systems, or complex 
biochemical gene-protein interactions are complex adaptive systems (Hooker 1989) 
that possess “information” that can become transmitted across generations. And retic-
ulate evolution (Margulis & Sagan 2000, 2002; Gontier 2015) can occur by means of 
symbiosis, symbiogenesis, infectious heredity, hybridization, and lateral gene transfer. 
Sometimes, such reticulate evolution requires the horizontal transmission of genetic 
material, sometimes it requires genetic exchange through sex, and sometimes it involves 
the merging of diff erent bodies into one another, such as bacteria that infect an organ-
ism’s airways. 
 Non-genetic and epigenetic information is also horizontally exchanged and shared 
between individuals at a sociocultural level. Strong parallels can be drawn between lan-
guage and culture borrowing and symbiogenesis, for example (Gontier 2006b, 2007), but 
the mechanisms whereby reticulate evolution occurs are yet to be universalized. 
 Turning to the fourth point, the recognition that numerous units, levels, and mech-
anisms of evolution exist necessitates us to investigate how these units and levels inter-
act as well as how the various mechanisms interact to bring forth evolution (Gontier 
2010). Units and levels form hierarchically nested realities (Salthe 1985; Tëmkin & 
Eldredge 2015; Pievani 2015), and the nested ontological layers increase in complex-
ity in what concerns their organization. Studying this increasing complexity relates 
to theorizing on the major transitions that life (Table 10.4) has gone through since 
its evolutionary emergence, transitions that are oft en defi ned in terms of new means 
to store and pass on information (Maynard Smith & Száthzmary 1995; Calcott & 
Sterenly 2011). 
 Table 10.4 Maynard Smith & Száthmary’s (1995) Major transitions in evolution 
Major Transitions in Evolution
Replicating molecules to populations of molecules
Independent replicators to chromosomes
RNA to DNA
Prokaryotes to Eukaryotes
Asexual clones to sexual populations
Protists to animals, plants and fungi
Solitary individuals to colonies
Primate societies to human societies
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 Th ese ideas also fi nd their roots in the works of early evolutionary epistemologists, 
who shared the aim to build a hierarchy or “taxonomy of behavior” (Lorenz 1941, 1958; 
Tinbergen 1963) that would map onto the tree of life and portray the evolution of knowl-
edge. Campbell (1959, 1974), for example, distinguished between ten and twelve stages 
of “inductively achieved knowledge,” and his stages provided an evolutionary line-up of 
the various informational systems that evolved. 
 Such theorizing therefore connects with the theorizing on how evolutionary mech-
anisms themselves are knowledge-acquiring devices, which brings us to the fi ft h point 
of the program. Lorenz (1941), the founder of ethology, Jean Piaget (1971), the founder 
of developmental psychology, Skinner (1986), one of the founders of behaviorism and 
operant conditioning, were all also evolutionary epistemologists; and Campbell (1959) 
had a background in comparative psychology. Th ese scholars commenced the investi-
gation of cognition and knowledge as an organismal trait that establishes itself during 
development (ontogeny), through trial and error, observational and other kinds of 
learning, and this development in turn is driven both by our evolved anatomical and 
neurocognitive constitution and by our equally evolved sociocultural environment, over 
the course of phylogeny. Skinner (1986) investigated operant conditioning in various 
animals, and he developed a theory of language learning that was based upon such oper-
ant conditioning. Behaviorist schools became accompanied with cognitive schools of 
thought (Piaget 1971) that attempted to enter the “black box” that had been the mind 
up until then. 
 Lorenz (1941) wrote what has become a classic paper in the fi eld wherein he reeval-
uated Kant’s synthetic a priori claims from within an evolutionary perspective. Most 
eukaryotic organisms are born with “instincts” or “fi xed action patterns” that can be 
understood as inborn knowledge because they comprise a set of biological expectations 
about and responses to a specifi c environment. Newborn ducks, for example, instinc-
tively follow the fi rst thing they see once they hatch. Under normal circumstances, they 
fi rst see their mother, and it is adaptive to follow her around because she provides food 
and protection. Th e newborn ducks do not see the mother as a “mother,” “caregiver,” or 
“protector,” but they evolved to instinctively follow the fi rst thing they see. Under exper-
imental conditions, Lorenz was able to demonstrate that they would also follow him, or 
even mobile toys such as trains. Such behavior is called “imprinting,” and it demonstrates 
a specifi c type of inborn knowledge about the environment. Before the duck was able to 
learn through experience what his mother can do for it, it “knows” to follow her around. 
Similarly, animal courtship and mating or fi ghting are highly ritualized behaviors, called 
“fi xed action patterns,” that enable organisms to respond adequately to certain environ-
mental cues. Experiments show that many organisms know how to behave sexually or 
violently before having observed or learned the behavior or having acted accordingly. 
 Such behavior is “known” from birth onward (and thus a priori given), but the rea-
son organisms possess this inborn knowledge is that it evolved over the course of evo-
lution. As such, Lorenz (1941), and later also Campbell (1959, 1974), reinterpreted 
Kant’s synthetic a priori (innate) knowledge as knowledge that was obtained synthet-
ically (inductively or a posteriori), by our ancestors over the course of phylogeny. Th e 
justifi cation for such claims was found in the theory of natural selection. Such a view 
furthermore implies that knowledge accumulates over time, and early ethologists 
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assumed that over the course of evolution, learned habits turned into inborn instincts, 
and thus somehow became conserved and transmitted through generations over time. 
Th is was a somewhat neo-Lamarckian claim, and current eco-evo-devo schools are 
studying the possibility of such inheritance of acquired characteristics, within and 
beyond the genome. 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Evolutionary epistemology is a fi eld particularly concerned with solving the problem of 
the development and transmission of information and knowledge through time, across 
all domains of life. Knowledge is thereby broadly conceived, and includes anatomical, 
cognitive, behavioral, and sociocultural traits displayed by organisms. As such, it has 
identifi ed a fundamental question that remained unanswered by the founders of the 
Modern Synthesis—namely, the question of how new information becomes introduced, 
stored, and transmitted over generations through time. 
 Natural selection  strictu sensu is a theory that explains how existing information is 
selected over time and how maladaptive information is deleted. To explain how novel 
information becomes introduced, Darwin made use of Lamarckian inheritance theory, 
but the founders of the Modern Synthesis conjectured that new traits resulted solely from 
small random genetic mutations. Today, we know that much more counts as informa-
tion than what is stored in genes, and this non-genetic and epigenetic information can 
become stored and transmitted through epigenetic mechanisms, drift , and mechanisms 
that underlie reticulate evolution. 
 Philosophy is most successful when it launches new research fi elds or even entire 
new scientifi c disciplines. Many of the founding fathers of evolutionary epistemology 
were also founding fathers of fi elds such as ethology, comparative psychology, behavior-
ism, and cognitive psychology. Th ese fi elds have now evolved into the new evolutionary 
sciences that include evolutionary psychology, evolutionary linguistics, evolutionary 
anthropology, evolutionary sociology, and so on. Nonetheless, many of the questions 
fi rst raised by evolutionary epistemologists have not been answered satisfactorily by 
the new evolutionary sciences. And because the research program has to some degree 
been incorporated into other disciplines, the major philosophical issues raised by the 
early evolutionary epistemologists have unfortunately been somewhat abandoned by 
philosophers. Th e problem of inductively acquired knowledge, or how ontogenetically 
acquired traits become players in phylogeny remains crucial for both philosophers 
and evolutionary scholars. Th e above outlined applied evolutionary epistemological 
research program provides a means whereby these diff erent fi elds can interact to fi nd 
answers. 
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